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The German Enlightenment 
 
 
In the last few decades, research on eighteenth-century German intellectual history 
has undergone major changes. Prominent scholars of a previous generation, such as 
Jürgen Habermas and Reinhart Koselleck, tended to view the Enlightenment in 
Germany as a relatively late phenomenon, tame and apolitical in comparison to other 
parts of Europe. In his later work, Koselleck himself revised his early and vehement 
critique of Enlightenment authors as hypocritically subverting the political sphere, as 
well as his almost exclusive focus on masonic lodges as venues of Enlightenment 
sociability (in Critique and Crisis of 1959). From a different ideological angle, and 
drawing on Immanuel Kant’s views of public debate, Habermas saw the 
Enlightenment in Germany as a late bloomer which was only partially and 
insufficiently politicized (in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 
1962). Earlier notable twentieth-century interpretations were largely abstracted from 
the eighteenth-century historical scene. Critics of the Enlightenment such as Max 
Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno (in their Dialectic of Enlightenment, 1944) and its 
advocates like Ernst Cassirer (in The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, 1932) 
regarded it first and foremost as a set of ideas that could be examined with scarce 
attention to the socio-political contexts of their production.  
From the 1970s onwards, interdisciplinary research on the Enlightenment in 
Germany (and elsewhere) began to focus on the nuances of eighteenth-century 
thought across Europe while grafting intellectual analysis onto an increasing 
awareness of the complex mechanisms involved in the production of knowledge, the 
use of media, and the socio-political conditions in which they took place. From the 
1970s to the 1990s, scholars such as Rudolf Vierhaus, Werner Schneiders, and Horst 
Möller extended the range of authors, topics, and positions considered as part of the 
Enlightenment. More recent work by Andreas Gestrich, Hans Erich Bödeker, Ursula 
Goldenbaum, and Steffen Martus (among many others) placed the Aufklärung on a 
par with its Scottish and French equivalents. It is now clear that German Aufklärer 
were self-consciously engaged, from the late seventeenth century onwards, in 
attempts at political, educational, legal, and religious reform. Though many 
contributors to the German Enlightenment held academic positions, the main thrust of 
the Aufklärung was – just as in France, Britain, or Italy – directed not at professional 
scholars (Gelehrte) but rather at the general educated public (Gebildete).  
 However, the term Enlightenment (or Aufklärung) remains heavily contested. 
Even when historians delimit the remit of the concept, assigning it to a particular 
historical period rather than an intellectual or moral programme, the public resonance 
of the Enlightenment remains high and problematic – especially when equated in an 
essentialist manner with modernity or some core values of the West. To discuss recent 
research on the Enlightenment, different views of the term, and its ideological use in 
public discourse outside academia (and sometimes within it), German History invited 
Thomas Ahnert (University of Edinburgh), Iwan-Michelangelo D’Aprile 
(University of Potsdam), Elisabeth Décultot (University of Halle-Wittenberg), and 
Simon Grote (Wellesley College, Massachusetts) to participate in a Forum. The 




1. Is it still possible or legitimate to talk about a distinctly German 
Enlightenment in light of recent research on the interconnectedness of the 
European intellectual world and the increasing focus on transnational 
and global history?  
 
Décultot: In order to answer to this question adequately, I first need to briefly outline 
my definition of Enlightenment within the diverse range of meanings assigned to the 
term. For reasons of space, I shall begin apodictically by saying that I understand 
Enlightenment as an epochal concept. This apparently unspectacular definition refers 
to two circumstances. First, Enlightenment is a term intended to refer to a period 
which facilitates or effects a fundamental operation of historiography, namely the 
division into longer or shorter time segments, selecting a particular time unit from the 
chronological continuum. I must, however, emphasise – and this is my second point – 
that I do not understand the Enlightenment as the sum of all events that took place 
during this era, but rather in the full sense of the word as an epochal concept, i.e., as a 
category sustained and conditioned by certain hermeneutical prerequisites and which 
– based on these prerequisites – allows for a certain access to the epoch in question. 
In other words, the Enlightenment is not the eighteenth century itself, but rather 
emerges from a certain reading of this epoch. 
The basis for this access are historical developments, agents, and intellectual 
approaches in the long eighteenth century, which at the time were only rarely 
associated explicitly with the concept of Enlightenment (or with the terms Aufklärung 
or Lumières). Many historians of the Enlightenment regard Montesquieu’s Esprit de 
Lois as a milestone of political ideas in the Lumières period, but the word Lumières 
never appears in this work. The fact that this work is regarded today as part of 
Enlightenment history is thus the consequence of a retrospective interpretation, whose 
foundations and prerequisites must be sought in an understanding of the 
Enlightenment as an epochal concept. And the Enlightenment has always been highly 
contested as an epochal concept, especially in Germany, where it was already being 
disputed in the nineteenth century. 
These remarks are by no means intended to question the legitimacy of this 
term as a historical category, since historical writing – as the works of Hayden White 
and Paul Ricœur, among others, have demonstrated – is always the result of a certain 
mise en récit and as such a construct fundamentally shaped by the historian’s 
intellectual structures, his or her mental map, so to speak. 
Traditionally, historians tended to study the European Enlightenment in 
separate countries, that is as French, British and German Enlightenments. Such a 
national approach lives on in the most recent literature, such as Steffen Martus’s book 
Aufklärung. Das deutsche 18. Jahrhundert (2015) shows. National divisions persist 
even in publications such as the Dictionnaire européen des Lumières (1997) or the 
historical lexicon L’illuminismo. Dizionario storico (2007), which take a 
supranational approach. The work in recent years that has dealt most intensively with 
the problem of the relationship between the Enlightenment as a supranational 
intellectual movement on the one hand and individual national Enlightenments on the 
other is perhaps Heinz Thomas’s Handbuch Europäische Aufklärung (2015). There, 
the Enlightenment is understood as a European movement, which, while particularly 
vibrant in Western Europe (in Britain and France), also manifested itself in many 
other European (or European-influenced) nations and regions.  
Studies that explicitly focus on the exchange between individual European 
regions or the actors and pathways of trans-European communication (via 
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correspondence, institutions etc.) are less common. Thus an institution such as the 
Berlin Academy of Sciences, which in the second half of the eighteenth century was 
an important site of communication between various manifestations of the European 
Enlightenment, was long explored solely through a nationally restricted, Prusso-
centric lens. A history of relations of exchange between the individual European 
Enlightenments, and especially between the German Enlightenment with its 
neighbours, thus remains to be written. 
 
Ahnert: The emphasis on the interconnectedness of the European intellectual world is 
perfectly compatible with references to a German Enlightenment, just as it is 
legitimate to speak of a French, a Scottish, or an English Enlightenment. Early 
modern nations were not the only units in the interconnected world of the 
Enlightenment, but intellectual exchange took place regularly across boundaries that 
were national, at least in a loose sense of the word. Nations might be defined by 
political borders, or by differences in the main language of vernacular publications. 
Religious confession could also contribute to differentiating them from each other. 
National differences mattered in the circulation of texts, people, and ideas, because 
the translation from one natural language to another, but also from a particular context 
in one nation to another in a different nation, affected the ways in which intellectual 
and cultural exports from one country were used and interpreted elsewhere. 
The characteristics of different nations were also the subject of debate among 
eighteenth-century thinkers, who, like humanist scholars before them, commented on 
the distinctiveness of various national communities. The differences they described 
were not necessarily the same as those identified by modern scholars. What is 
important is that national differences were of interest to them. They might even 
express admiration for other nations, or feel called upon to defend their own against 
outsiders. Christian Thomasius’s introductory remarks in his lecture on the imitation 
of the French are evidence of such concerns, as are reactions to the plagiarism dispute 
between Leibniz and Newton, or Herder’s comments on French culture. 
Some intellectual currents are best understood as transnational phenomena, 
which extended across several early-modern nations and had an existence above 
national contexts. Scholars have, for example, argued for a transnational Arminian 
Enlightenment (J. G. A. Pocock) and a transnational Radical Enlightenment (Jonathan 
Israel). Yet Enlightenment thought was influenced by the division of the European 
intellectual world into loosely defined nations and eighteenth-century thinkers’ 
perceptions of national differences. 
 
Grote: It is indeed still legitimate to talk about a distinctly German Enlightenment— 
and I say this as an intellectual historian who finds transnational approaches 
extremely appealing.  One reason for this appeal, familiar to me from my own work, 
is that a transnational perspective can aid intellectual historians in the reconstruction 
of historical debates.  Such reconstruction typically involves delineating multiple, 
more-or-less contemporary historical positions on a question addressed by a range of 
authors.  This is a technique of great critical power, in part because it allows us to 
revive once-credible but hitherto forgotten alternatives to now-familiar ideas, and to 
illuminate the complexity of issues that have, for various historical reasons, become 
oversimplified in present-day discussion.  A transnational approach to the 
reconstruction of historical debates allows us to illuminate more of those debates’ 
complexity, or to make more convincing arguments about how the debates were 
actually conducted, or to assess the degree to which a particular way of approaching a 
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problem was nationally specific.  A transnational approach also reflects the reality 
that many topics were being discussed in the eighteenth century (as in other centuries) 
in a philosophical, theological, or otherwise learned vocabulary absorbed from 
authors, ancient and modern, common to the university curricula and learned 
discourse of many countries. 
I see such an approach as entirely compatible with a more local focus, one that 
keeps in mind the fact that authors and their publishers were producing texts for 
multiple audiences: local, regional, and global.  Many German authors were taking 
positions in debates that they knew were active among non-German authors, and they 
understood that their contributions to those debates might well be acknowledged and 
responded to by authors in other countries.  At the same time, many of those same 
authors were also hoping to shape beliefs and policy more locally by writing for 
audiences close to home: politicians, colleagues, or others within a single city, for 
example, or their own university students.  And publishers, of course, were happy to 
produce books that would appeal simultaneously to a variety of groups who might 
buy them for a range of different reasons.  This fact of multiple audiences, impressed 
upon me by my own recent forays into book history, is what gives me confidence that 
approaching intellectual history from a transnational perspective need not be at odds 
with our recognizing the local significance of the texts and authors we study — 
including for audiences that we could reasonably identify as German in terms of 
geography, language, or connection to a political body such as the Holy Roman 
Empire.  
 
D’Aprile: I remember a European history conference a few years ago at which a few 
participants became embroiled in a very serious dispute over whether eighteenth-
century Bratislava was a Slovak, Hungarian, or German city. This is just one example 
of how anachronistic distinctions are being discussed under the pretext of 
historicisation, distinctions that have rather little to do with the eighteenth century but 
everything to do with the national myths of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
The fact that such archaisms and homogenising ideologies are being powerfully 
recycled again for political ends nowadays does not make them any more historically 
correct. Is Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger’s splendid recent book about Maria Theresa a 
contribution to the history of the German or the Austrian Enlightenment?  
References to a German, Scottish, Amsterdam or Parisian Enlightenment, in 
contrast, can only ever be (more or less precise) conceptual shorthand for the attempt 
to localise the trans-European and transnational Enlightenment discourse in its field-
specific variants on the ground. In this sense there is no contradiction between the 
‘transnational turn’ and the ‘topographical turn’ in the history of the Enlightenment; 
Steffen Martus’s extensive study of the ‘German eighteenth century’, for example, 
can teach us a good deal about the local particularities of the Enlightenment in the 
Holy Roman Empire. Those interested in the multifarious European entanglements of 
the German Enlightenment will probably turn to the works of Elisabeth Décultot, and 
Martin Mulsow has shown the degree to which specific, regionally focused debates in 
the early Enlightenment in Germany exist within a global intellectual history that 
extends well beyond Europe’s borders. 
 
 
2. If we can still define a specifically German Enlightenment, what are its 
main characteristics? How is it distinguished from Enlightenment 
movements in other countries?  
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D’Aprile: If we proceed from the assumption that the German Enlightenment cannot 
be defined historically in terms of a political, cultural, religious or even linguistic 
unity, some of its specific characteristics such as polycentrism, multiconfessionalism 
or multilingualism emerge ex negativo. They do not apply solely to the German 
Enlightenment, but at least equally to the entire region of central and eastern Europe, 
where they are of decisive importance. The political fragmentation of the Holy 
Roman Empire with its weak central power led to the formation of numerous centres 
of the Enlightenment: courts and royal capitals, commercial cities, universities and 
academies with their varying field conditions and discourse formations. Overlapping 
confessional Lutheran, Calvinist, Pietist or Catholic Reform Enlightenment 
movements crossed territorial borders. The German Enlightenment would be 
inconceivable without the Haskalah or Huguenot exile networks, which played an 
essential role in the formation of the Enlightenment from the late seventeenth century 
to the reform debates of the late Enlightenment. And the German Enlightenment 
cannot even be understood as a German-language Enlightenment if we are not to 
exclude by definition some of the fundamental texts at its core, such as Christian 
Wolff’s Latin works, Moses Mendelssohn’s Hebrew writings, or the French texts 
written by Leibniz, Frederick II, or Alexander von Humboldt. Multilingualism as an 
important trait of the German Enlightenment is also evident in the outstanding role 
played in it by translations and adaptations – to a far greater degree than in France or 
Britain. This is true both quantitatively, as reflected in the number of translations, and 
qualitatively with respect to the evolution of specific positions. The latter point is 
particularly manifest in the omnipresent contemporary labels applied to proponents of 
the Enlightenment who were known by such monikers as the ‘German Hume’, the 
‘German Voltaire’ or the ‘German Addison’. Ever since the writings of Leibniz and 
Wolff, German Enlightenment thinkers repeatedly imagined China as an enlightened 
model state; in light of their vibrant practice of adaptation, they might actually be 
regarded from a historical perspective as the so-called ‘European Chinese’ of the 
eighteenth century.  
 
Ahnert: National boundaries are important to understanding the effects of the 
exchange and circulation of ideas on Enlightenment thought, but it is difficult to 
generalise about the nature of the German or any other national Enlightenment. Like 
any Enlightenment in a particular geographical region, the German Enlightenment 
stood for a variety of intellectual positions. It cannot be derived from a set of core, 
essentially German beliefs. The disagreements between various Aufklärer were often 
as deep as those between some Aufklärer and thinkers in other parts of Europe. 
Certain structural features did set apart the Enlightenment in the German lands 
from that in some other parts of Europe. One of these is the role of universities. Many 
of the main representatives of the German Enlightenment, from Thomasius to Wolff, 
Lichtenberg, and Kant, were university professors, though others, like Leibniz or 
Lessing, were not. The German lands were also distinctive in having an unusually 
large number of universities. England and France, by contrast, had far fewer, and a far 
smaller proportion of the thinkers associated with the Enlightenment there taught at 
universities. Universities were also prominent elsewhere, in the Scottish 
Enlightenment, for example, where thinkers such as Francis Hutcheson, Adam Smith, 
Hugh Blair, Adam Ferguson, or John Millar held academic teaching posts. But in 
other respects the situation there was very different from that in the German-speaking 
lands. Scotland was much smaller than the Holy Roman Empire. The great number of 
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universities in the German lands was a product of the religious division and political 
fragmentation of the Empire. Scotland, by contrast, was a small, confessionally 
homogenous kingdom within a much larger British state.  
The Enlightenment in the German lands was also characterised by the fact that 
it developed in many different intellectual centres, in territories that enjoyed a certain 
degree of political autonomy. These centres might be courts, universities, learned 
societies, or academies. The existence of these many centres increased the 
opportunities for official patronage, support, and employment for the Aufklärer. It 
also seems to have created some degree of freedom for intellectual dissent. When 
Christian Thomasius was forced to leave Leipzig, he found a position in Halle; when 
Christian Wolff was expelled from Halle he was offered a position at Marburg. The 
failure to suppress the Wertheim Bible, a rationalist translation of the Pentateuch by 
Johann Lorenz Schmidt (1737), was also related to the polycentric political structure 
of the Empire. 
 
Décultot: If we understand the Enlightenment – following my reply to the first 
question – as an epochal concept, the second question can be understood as one about 
the specificity of works on the Enlightenment era in Germany in contrast to other 
European and non-European countries. 
According to a view of Enlightenment strongly influenced by Kant, one 
peculiarity of the German history of ideas in this period seems to lie in the 
understanding of Enlightenment as primarily an individual, epistemological process, 
presupposing both the autonomous and the critical or self-critical application of 
thought. The main protagonist and proponent of this cognitive process is the 
individual (not the group); its genuine site is the university; its most important media 
are books and periodicals; its central discipline is philosophy, followed by theology. 
This last point perhaps explains a further peculiarity of this German concept: that anti-
religious polemic, atheism, and systematic materialism play a smaller role in the 
history of the German Enlightenment than for example in that of its French 
counterpart. In Germany, radical forms of the Enlightenment – as represented by 
Hermann Samuel Reimarus – developed mainly underground, as demonstrated in 
Martin Mulsow’s research. The German Enlightenment is thus largely understood as a 
process tightly connected to scholarship as an institutionally secured means of 
organising the generation and dissemination of knowledge. Finally, viewed against 
the background of the historiography on the French Lumières as well as the British 
Enlightenment, there seems to be somewhat weaker focus on the question of the 
practical effect of Enlightenment ideas in non-scholarly circles.  
 
Grote: What makes this question difficult to answer, I think, is that finding the main 
characteristics of the German Enlightenment is not simply a matter of observation.  
Rather, it requires that we presuppose a general definition, at least as a starting point 
for our investigations.  Given the state of the field, this is not easy.  Reflecting the 
heterogeneity of current scholarship on the Enlightenment more broadly, scholarship 
specifically on the German Enlightenment offers a wide variety of more-or-less 
mutually exclusive options, each of which tends to lead to a focus on different texts, 
people, or other historical phenomena.  
The open question of how to position the philosopher Christian Wolff and his 
putative eighteenth-century German adherents vis-à-vis the Enlightenment illustrates 
the difficulty.  In identifying a German Enlightenment, one option has been to look 
for exemplars of freethinking, atheism, and other beliefs widely subject to state 
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suppression and circulated in various clandestine ways.  This approach can easily lead 
to a focus on figures such as the so-called radical Wolffians of the mid-century.  It 
produces a portrait of a German Enlightenment that, while distinguished by the 
peculiarities of Wolffianism as a set of philosophical commitments and practices, is 
nonetheless at least somewhat compatible with the ‘radical’ Enlightenments that 
scholars such as Margaret Jacob and Jonathan Israel have delineated with reference to 
France, the Netherlands, England, and other places.   
Another option has long been to focus on what some theologians and social 
scientists call a modernization or naturalization of Christianity: an increasing regard 
for natural human cognition, as applied to the study of human history and the natural 
world, as the most reliable — or indeed the only reliable — instrument for the 
acquisition of knowledge and for the authorization of interpretations of the Bible.  
From this perspective, represented by Karl Aner’s still-fundamental Theologie der 
Lessingzeit (1929), the so-called ‘conservative’ or ‘theological’ Wolffians look like 
bearers of Enlightenment.  More recent research has located various Jewish and 
Catholic theologians within the same general framework.   
There is of course a range of other options in addition to these.  For many 
historians of philosophy, Immanuel Kant remains the archetypal Enlightenment 
figure; whereas other historians have presented Christian Thomasius as a 
representative of an Enlightenment very different from those Enlightenments 
represented by Wolffians or by Kant.  Still others have invited the incorporation of a 
broader range of conflicting ideologies within the German Enlightenment by defining 
it in terms of social structures or discursive norms, or by identifying it, very generally 
and theologically non-specifically, with a commitment to the perfection of human 
beings, human institutions, and human communities.  This last hallmark has found 
favour with historians aiming to categorize German Pietism as belonging to the 
Enlightenment. 
Each of these options has been championed by distinguished historians, has 
underlain fruitful research agendas, and has produced excellent scholarship. So how 
to choose a definition?  How, in other words, to choose a German Enlightenment?  
One’s choice depends largely on what particular vision of modernity one believes the 
word Enlightenment should denote.  Most of the current options have a particular 
political valence recognizable to today’s readers; they focus our attention on 
resistance to an overbearing or authoritarian state, or on rational religion, or on 
religious toleration, or on scientific approaches to the acquisition of knowledge, or on 
innovations of one kind or another.  They pick out a particular modernization 
narrative, often in order to give comfort or hope to today’s adherents of whatever 
ideology seems to occupy the end-phase of that narrative.  As someone who — 
naively — has tended to see himself as apolitical in his scholarship, and who has only 
recently begun to think seriously about his own scholarship’s political implications, I 
would still find it difficult to insist that we attach the term Enlightenment, with all its 
rhetorical power, to one vision of modernity rather than another.  At the same time, I 
sympathize with those scholars who have been resisting an ecumenical, survey-type 
approach that bundles all the current scholarly options together under the heading ‘the 
Enlightenment (or ‘the German Enlightenment’), allowing the term Enlightenment to 
encompass nearly all imaginable ideologies, and thereby — so it seems to me — 




3. What is the relationship between intellectual debates (generated by 
Enlightenment authors) and political change in eighteenth-century 
Germany?  
  
Grote:  Again, the answer to the question of the relationship between Enlightenment 
and political change can vary radically depending upon one’s definition of 
Enlightenment and which authors one sees as its representatives.  Here, the current 
scholarly disagreement about whether to encompass Pietism within the Enlightenment 
illustrates this variability in the case of early eighteenth-century Brandenburg-Prussia.  
The decision by King Friedrich Wilhelm I to expel Christian Wolff in 1723 was 
clearly the result of the king having been influenced by debate within his circle of 
advisors, which included sophisticated representatives of positions that 
contemporaries were characterizing as Wolffian or Pietist.  August Hermann Francke, 
Pietist par excellence, seems to have swayed the king decisively.  The traditional 
historiography, which assigned Pietism at least implicitly to some version of a 
counter-Enlightenment, presented the king as having acted in opposition to the 
Enlightenment as represented by Wolff, such that the entire incident could be pointed 
to as an indication of Enlightenment’s political weakness before 1740.  But now it has 
also become acceptable, following accounts by scholars such as Ian Hunter or Martin 
Gierl, to categorize Francke and Wolff as representatives of competing 
Enlightenments or of a single, broadly defined Enlightenment. Within this framework, 
the king must be seen as having made a choice among positions within an 
Enlightenment debate about educational and broader societal reform.  From this 
perspective, the incident begins to look like an example of Enlightenment authors 
dominating court and university rather than struggling with their enemies for 
influence. 
 
D’Aprile:  Political change proceeded slowly in the eighteenth-century German 
principalities, and it was still influenced throughout by corporate conflicts and reform 
attempts within the absolutist princely states. Even within this framework, reforms – 
for instance along the model of Turgot – could not be implemented, or only in the 
short term, as the example of Josephinism in Austria shows. A political application of 
farther-reaching Enlightenment reform objectives in the direction of legal equality or 
the removal of the privileges and powers of the estates is only observable after the 
Napoleonic challenge and the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire in the early 
nineteenth century – if we ignore unstable republican attempts under French 
protection such as the Mainz Republic.  
If we enquire into the historical significance of intellectual debates within this 
change, it is important to take account of their relationships of political, social, and 
economic interdependence. Ever since writers such as Heinrich Heine began 
reflecting historically on the German Enlightenment as a period, they repeatedly drew 
attention to the discrepancy between ideas and social reality as well as to a certain 
intellectual ‘surplus’ within the German Enlightenment. The fact that these ideas 
nevertheless did not float in a vacuum, but very much represented certain social and 
political energies, can only be reconstructed if we locate them precisely in media, 
material culture, institutions and discourses. To that extent, I would respond to this 
complex question with the methodological argument that we should expand the 
history of political ideas to encompass suitable methods drawn from social and media 
history. Conversely, on the basis of their knowledge of the central political positions 
of the eighteenth century, intellectual historians can provide correctives to the 
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dissolution of the political within some models of cultural studies. Only by combining 
the two can we adequately discuss the meaning of certain ideas in the changing 
political spectrum of the Enlightenment. 
 
Ahnert:  In 1790 Carl Leonhard Reinhold wrote that ‘[o]f all European states, 
Germany is the one most suited to a revolution of the mind and the least suited to 
political revolution’. That statement has been quoted by some to suggest that a 
peculiarly German gap existed between enlightened ideals and political practice. 
There was certainly little transformative political change in the eighteenth-century 
German lands until the invasions by the French revolutionary armies at the very end 
of the century overturned the legal and institutional structures of the Empire. It is 
often implied that Enlightenment debate should have led to political change, and that 
its failure to do so in the German case calls for an explanation. 
Enlightenment authors in the German lands did not on the whole wield formal 
political power, though there were some possible alternatives to more formal modes 
of political representation. Private societies and clubs, like the Berlin 
Mittwochsgesellschaft, for example, could serve as venues for enlightened debate, and 
sometimes the members of such associations were also state officials. But the 
relationship between debates in these societies and political practice was far from 
straightforward. Rulers did not take political decisions in response to discussions in 
them. Those members who were also state officials rarely advocated far-reaching 
political change.  
Some historians have argued that Enlightenment authors hoped to influence 
rulers by contributing to the formation of public opinion, as another alternative to 
more formal kinds of political representation. But the relationship between this public 
opinion, which was never uniform and not always particularly enlightened, and 
political practice was diffuse. Authors might appeal to the tribunal of public opinion, 
but it is not clear that actual public opinion had the power to cause political change, 
or, if it did, that the change would conform to Enlightenment principles. 
It is sometimes suggested that Enlightenment authors’ lack of political 
influence produced a pent-up demand for political change, or that it led intellectuals 
to withdraw from active political engagement altogether and devote themselves to the 
pursuit of apolitical, cultural activities instead. The absence of enlightened political 
change however does not seem all that remarkable when it is compared to the 
situation in other parts of Europe. The caution and conservatism of German 
Enlightenment authors was not that different from the attitudes of the general run of 
Enlightenment thinkers elsewhere – in Scotland, for example, or even France, where 
the French Revolution at the end of the century has sometimes obscured the relative 
lack of political radicalism among the philosophes. Although Enlightenment debate 
may on particular occasions have inspired political change, there is no necessary or 
even strong connection between the two. 
 
Décultot:  To me it is actually striking that many territories of the eighteenth-century 
Holy Roman Empire were marked by a dynamism that already began in the 
seventeenth century. This dynamism was characterised by the attempt to enforce 
greater efficiency in state administration, and particularly to strengthen the central 
hubs of power. The reforms enacted in Prussia in the course of the eighteenth century 
stand out here, along with Josephinism in the Habsburg lands. It is completely 
unsurprising that this ‘modernisation’ of absolutism also took up the current 
discourses of the day, and that state reforms sought legitimacy by referring to the 
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figure of the wise, rational, or enlightened monarch. We need to ask, however, 
whether the transformation of the state really occurred in and together with the age of 
Enlightenment. To be sure, the principle of religious tolerance, which could rely on 
the writings of prominent Enlightenment authors such as Lessing, attained a new 
resonance in political practice, but in Germany this had been the order of the day 
since the end of the Thirty Years War (at least in relations among the various 
Christian confessions). What was new was also the growing significance of an 
educated public sphere made up of both the nobility and the middle classes – and 
associated with it the necessity, more than previously, for the various governments or 
monarchs to present at least some semblance of a progressive image. Frederick II, as 
author of the Anti-Machiavel and public interlocutor of Voltaire, was especially 
innovative in this area. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, other princes (for 
example Anna Amalia und Carl August in Weimar or Prince Franz in Dessau) sought 
to shape their public image by means of ambitious cultural policies. 
 
 
4. How do you see the interface between Enlightenment, Weimar Classicism, 
and Romanticism; can we determine when the German Enlightenment 
‘ended’? 
 
Ahnert:  Enlightenment, Weimar Classicism, and Romanticism are closely related 
phenomena which overlap and blend into each other. Yet Weimar Classicism and 
Romanticism are often contrasted to the Enlightenment because they are both 
considered reactions, in different ways, to rationalist, modernising, and emancipatory 
ideas that continue to be associated with Enlightenment thought. Weimar Classicism 
has been described as a kind of illiberal, elitist movement, whose members withdrew 
from politics and turned to cultural activity instead. Romanticism is seen as a reaction 
against the supposedly excessive rationalism of Enlightenment thinkers. 
The similarities and continuities between all three of these intellectual currents 
are, however, stronger than is sometimes acknowledged. Although Romantic authors 
presented themselves as critics of the Enlightenment, their rhetoric often masked an 
indebtedness to earlier Enlightenment ideas, on which they drew heavily. Weimar 
Classicism is best understood as one expression of Enlightenment culture in the 
German lands rather than as a distinct movement. The disagreements between a 
thinker like Basedow and a representative of Weimar Classicism such as Goethe, for 
example, reflected two varieties of Enlightenment thought rather than a conflict 
between two clearly separate intellectual currents. 
The belief that Enlightenment, Weimar Classicism, and Romanticism are 
distinct from each other is often tied to a narrow definition of Enlightenment, 
according to which the Enlightenment was committed to certain key principles such 
as philosophical rationalism and liberal, progressive political and social ideals in 
particular. Weimar Classicism, with its lack of interest in political and social activism, 
and Romanticism, with its hostility to excessive rationalism, appears to be excluded 
from that definition. But so would large parts of German eighteenth-century thought, 
if this strict definition of Enlightenment were applied to them. 
In fact, Enlightenment, in the German lands as much as anywhere else, was a 
diffuse intellectual and cultural phenomenon which embraced a great variety of ideas 
and beliefs. The term ‘Enlightenment’ is perhaps best used in a very loose sense, to 
refer to the sum of the debates and ideas of the period from the late seventeenth to the 
early nineteenth centuries, rather than to any coherent, well-defined intellectual 
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programme. Enlightenment in that broad sense includes mutually contradictory 
positions, all of which, however, are equally characteristic of that period. 
Like all historical periodisations, ‘the Enlightenment’ is to some extent no 
more than a convenient label. Yet there are good reasons to date the end of the 
Enlightenment to the first decades of the nineteenth century. Although there were 
significant intellectual continuities between the age of Enlightenment and the mid- to 
late nineteenth century, there was an important change in that the Enlightenment 
began to be viewed increasingly as a past phenomenon. The fact that contemporaries 
would no longer have considered themselves to be part of ‘the Enlightenment’ makes 
it difficult to apply that term to the intellectual and cultural history of the period after 
the 1810s.  
 
Grote:  Naturally, locating the end of a historical period requires us to have a clearly 
defined concept of the period whose end we are attempting to locate.  That said, a 
periodizing label developed by specialists interested in one thing may get reused, with 
a different definition, by another group of specialists interested in tracking the 
trajectory of something else.  And once a carefully defined periodization comes into 
common usage, it can be hard even for scholars of the period to remain fully 
conscious of the distinctions among its original definitions and prevent it from 
drifting into a more casual and either purely temporal or at least opaquely multivalent 
label. Like Enlightenment, Romanticism is of course a classic example of this last 
phenomenon, as Arthur O. Lovejoy famously explained over fifty years ago.  At the 
same time, because some period labels have not drifted as far as others, periodization 
varies significantly among the many disciplinary perspectives from which research on 
eighteenth-century Germany is being done today.   
 
Décultot:  In German historiography, the dividing line between the Enlightenment 
and the epochal concepts that followed (Weimar Classicism or Romanticism) is 
generally located in the final decade of the eighteenth century. The reason for this 
division is the increasingly harsh criticism of what was described as stifling 
rationalism, or of a manner of disseminating popular philosophical knowledge 
associated with the concept of Enlightenment. 
 That Goethe himself – for instance in his early and also late critique of Sulzer as 
a representative of Enlightenment aesthetics – sought to distance himself from the 
‘errors of the so-called Enlightenment’ contributed quite substantially to the 
construction of a historiographical break between Enlightenment and Classicism. And 
Novalis’s rebellion against the ‘priests’ and ‘mystagogues’ of the Enlightenment, who 
allegedly erased ‘every trace of the sacred’ and stripped ‘the world of colourful 
ornament’, provided the basis for the introduction of a historiographical break 
between the Enlightenment and a supposedly anti-rationalist Romanticism. Such 
divisions were widespread in historiography, especially nineteenth-century literary 
history. 
 It should, however, be emphasised here that such historiographical divisions, 
demarcated by epochal concepts, always have a performative character, i.e., that by 
simply referring to such breaks between individual eras they generate almost 
automatically these very divisions. They do so in two respects: first, they contribute to 
an excessive emphasis on what is new about the nascent period, while at the same 
time ignoring continuities – for example between Classical or ‘Romantic’ concepts on 
the one hand, and the philosophical, political, and anthropological thought of the 
Enlightenment on the other. Not infrequently, the figures who confirm such 
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continuities, and who cannot be clearly categorised using the various epochal 
concepts in question, are treated as rather peripheral – in this case Johann Gottfried 
Herder, Carl Philipp Moritz, Christoph Martin Wieland or Jean Paul. 
The epochal divisions in question unfortunately also exhibit this performative 
character with respect to scholarly practice. In academia, such epochal concepts tend 
to produce autonomous areas of competence: among literary scholars, for instance, 
specialists in Weimar Classicism are frequently insufficiently familiar with the 
Enlightenment period as a whole because it is not considered part of their own field of 
expertise.  
 
D’Aprile:  It is fortunate, however, that nowadays we rarely have to debate whether 
Schiller or Herder were figures of Enlightenment as opposed to Classicism or 
Romanticism. Parallel developments in the late eighteenth century, which are 
described using labels such as Weimar Classicism or early Romanticism, refer mainly 
to local and temporally circumscribed or mainly literary phenomena of ‘high culture’. 
They are thus far more narrowly conceived than the notion of the Enlightenment era. 
A number of additional terms are also in circulation for the period of upheaval around 
1800, including an ‘Age of Revolution’, Koselleck’s Sattelzeit, or the Foucauldian 
shift from epistemes of representation to historical epistemes. Each of these terms 
stresses particular points of view. The similarly oft-used epochal term ‘around 1800’ 
seeks to counter the adoption such an essentialist point of view, seemingly aiming at 
the mere simultaneity of various tendencies. In the literature on the Enlightenment, 
there now seems to be a broad consensus that one can speak of a ‘long eighteenth 
century’ of the German Enlightenment. The realisation of certain political reforms in 
Prussia in the period after 1806, the intellectual debates over the French Revolution, 
or the various forms and formats of the ‘popular Enlightenment’ are developments 
that reach into the nineteenth century and are usually subsumed under the term ‘late 
Enlightenment’. The end of the long eighteenth century cannot be located in a specific 
year or event, but it would be hard to find a historian who considers the period after 
1830 to be part of the German Enlightenment, quite simply because intellectual 
discourse was framed then by the new conditions of accelerated technological change 
and the recent formation of an industrial class society. 
 
 
5. How is the Enlightenment, and particularly the German Enlightenment, 
used (or abused) in public discourse outside academia — and what can 
historians contribute to such debates? 
 
Décultot:  Even as it was used in the eighteenth century, the term Enlightenment was 
already a battle cry or at least a slogan that pointed to a programme that was somehow 
devoted to the idea of perfectibility. To that extent, it does not bother me in principle 
when the term is still (or yet again) used nowadays in a broader public arena outside 
academia. Drawing connections between current and eighteenth-century debates can 
even be useful, because it helps to prevent the history of the eighteenth century from 
becoming a lifeless mass of facts slumbering in dusty archives.     
I do expect scholarly discourse, however, to avoid making anachronistic 
comparisons or simply equating our time with the eighteenth century. Such 
comparisons can lead to a trivial reductionism that treats the Enlightenment as the 
launch pad of modernity. Far more dangerously, they can lead to the opposite 
conclusion that – against the background of our present-day values – there was no 
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eighteenth-century Enlightenment at all, for instance because its proponents were not 
sufficiently devoted to women’s equality or, by the standards of today’s postcolonial 
studies, did not cultivate a consistent anti-colonial discourse. 
Within such debates on the concept of Enlightenment, I see scholars’ central 
task as helping to avoid anachronism, stressing the differences and continuities 
between the present and the eighteenth century, and above all revealing the 
complexity of this epochal concept and its applications. 
 
D’Aprile:  The question of the use and abuse of the term Enlightenment is not simply 
limited to the broader public discourse outside academia. Ideological or simply 
instrumental uses of the Enlightenment can be found both inside and outside 
universities. Indeed, one of the main critiques offered by eighteenth-century 
Enlightenment authored was aimed to show that narrow-mindedness and arrogance 
were no less prevalent in academic circles than elsewhere; see, for example, the 
omnipresent criticism of scholars in the German Enlightenment ever since Thomasius.  
As in other debates over the politics of history, only historicisation would 
help. However, historicising here does not mean adopting a neo-Rankean concept of 
‘showing what actually happened’ but rather a two-way process of reciprocally 
tailoring categories and the use of concepts while reconstructing historical reality. The 
reciprocal relationships of interdependence between epistemological interest and 
object construction is evident not least from the history of the reception of the 
Enlightenment in nineteenth- and twentieth-century German academic historiography, 
which is teeming with arbitrary reductionism, stereotypes, and denigrations of the 
Enlightenment era because it was meant to represent the Other (by turns British, 
French, or Jewish) of an alleged German national character. To mention two more 
recent instances of abuse: the different versions of the old thesis of the ‘decline of the 
West’ present the Enlightenment as something of ‘our own’, which is now threatened 
by the Other, generally ‘Islam’ but more generally the ‘non-European’ or the ‘non-
Western’ – whether in Pegida’s street version or in the academically dressed-up 
version found in books bearing titles such as How We Are Squandering the 
Achievements of the Enlightenment. Or, in the tradition of the Counter-Enlightenment, 
authors deny that there was ever such a thing as the Enlightenment at all, declaring 
instead that religion or ‘cultural identity’ is the driving factor in history. By contrast, 
the Enlightenment is condemned as a mere propaganda trick of self-styled intellectual 
elites from the eighteenth century to the present. What both approaches share is their 
ahistorical cultural essentialism. Historians who study the Enlightenment should at 
least point out the over-simplification, one-sidedness, and distortion inherent in such 
historical constructs as well as their links to the relevant epistemological and power 
interests, whether in the academic field or in public discourse. 
 
Ahnert:  In public discourse the Enlightenment continues to be regarded, and usually 
celebrated, as a key moment in the transition to modernity. As a result, non-academic 
discussions about the Enlightenment have a tendency to mutate into debates about the 
benefits and disadvantages of modernity, understood in a particular way. The 
defenders of modernity will emphasise the importance of, for example, rationalism, 
tolerance, scientific and technological progress, and political and economic freedom, 
all of which, it is said, are modern values that were promoted or even invented by the 
Enlightenment. Critics of modernity will accuse its defenders of shallow optimism 
and of turning a blind eye to the harmful effects of modernity, among which they may 
include the environmental costs of technological change, a casual disregard for the 
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dangerous uses to which scientific discoveries can be put, a narrowly economic 
understanding of well-being, or an arrogant belief in the superiority of ‘the West’ over 
other cultures. The conflation of Enlightenment with a certain kind of modernity also 
explains why in recent years the Enlightenment has been held up as an antidote to 
religious (mainly Islamic) fundamentalism and political populism. 
Like modernity, the Enlightenment has been criticised for being naïve or 
dishonest about its true nature. But critics and defenders alike often agree on what the 
Enlightenment is supposed to represent, which is, above all, an optimistic belief in 
secular reason, human progress, and various other ‘modern’ values. The disagreement 
seems to be mostly over whether that belief is valuable and well-founded, or 
superficial and even hypocritical.  
This identification of the Enlightenment with modernity unfortunately tends to 
limit the range and nature of the questions that are asked about the Enlightenment as a 
historical phenomenon. Crude presentism in public discourse is a common problem 
for historians, but it seems to be especially pronounced in the case of the 
Enlightenment because its intellectual importance for the contemporary world has 
been emphasised so strenuously for such a long time. 
Public discussion about the German Enlightenment is also hampered by the 
fact that not much is known about it outside specialist academic circles. There is little 
awareness of the main figures of the German Enlightenment. Immanuel Kant and 
Frederick the Great may be familiar names, but few others are. Understanding of the 
more general characteristics of the German Enlightenment is also very limited. When 
a broader opinion about the German Enlightenment is expressed, it is likely to be a 
variation on the Sonderweg theory, implying that German thinkers in the eighteenth 
century were more concerned with cultural pursuits than with practical social and 
political matters.  
Although there are connections between the eighteenth century and the 
present, they are not as obvious or direct as is often suggested in public discourse. The 
contributions historians can make to this discourse are limited. Their most useful 
comments are likely to reflect a difficult balancing act between developing a more 
nuanced understanding of the Enlightenment as an historical phenomenon and 
nurturing public interest in it.  
 
Grote:  In current non-academic public discourse, I see far less interest in the German 
Enlightenment than in the Enlightenment more generally.  Nor do I notice in the 
popular press much attention to the different historical contexts or the precise 
distinctions between the views of the continually invoked canon of Enlightenment 
authors, such as Kant, Voltaire, Rousseau, or Adam Smith.   
In and of itself, of course, painting with a broad brush does not need to involve 
making historically false claims.  Nor, as far as I can see, do the rigorous 
historiographical standards that we uphold, insofar as we represent the profession of 
historians, forbid us from using historical research to intervene in ethical or political 
debates, let alone from making arguments that reflect specific moral or political 
values.  In fact, because the very term ‘Enlightenment’ is so value-laden by virtue of 
its close connection to concepts of modernity, it is hard to imagine how a historian 
could make an argument about it that does not reflect a certain set of values. In 
Enlightenment studies, therefore, as in so many other areas of historical research, 
citizenship (and I speak now as an American citizen) and membership in the historical 
profession may not be fully separable.   
For these reasons, I do not see historians as professionally bound to play only 
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a sceptical, deflationary role in public discourse, pointing out exceptions to general 
assertions about the Enlightenment and providing reminders that the present is in so 
many ways unlike the past.  Among the contributions historians are well positioned to 
make, in addition to supplying often badly needed scepticism of this type, is to draw 
on their own experience developing and analyzing modernization and other historical 
narratives, in order to help a broader public see how narratives such as those 
connected with the Enlightenment get constructed and how they can be assessed: that 
is, how their authors almost invariably adduce historical facts in connection with pre-
conceived concepts and values, and how the standards by which we can and should 
assess the truth of the former are not fully applicable to the latter. 
 
